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Abstract: Emerging in the cracks of the ownership model are alternatives to
state/market provision of affordable housing and public/private-led regeneration of de-
clining urban neighbourhoods, centred on commoning and collective dweller control.
This paper explores how the community land trust model can become an effective
institutional solution to urban decline in the context of private property relations. It ex-
plores a case study of a CLT campaign in Granby, a particularly deprived inner-city
neighbourhood in Liverpool, England. The campaign seeks to collectively acquire empty
homes under conditions of austerity, which have opened up the space for grassroots ex-
perimentation with guerrilla gardening, proving important for the campaign in gaining
political trust and ﬁnancial support. This paper discusses the potential of the CLT model
as a vehicle for democratic stewardship of place and unpacks the contradictions threaten-
ing to undermine its political legitimacy.
Keywords: neighbourhood regeneration, community land trusts, housing commons,
guerrilla gardening
Introduction: Dilapidated Dwelling
Modernity, it seems, is exempliﬁed not so much by the business park or the airport, but
by the dilapidated dwelling (Keiller 2013:54).
Every tenth house or ﬂat seems to be empty and tinned-up. Quite a few have been
burned out … The Liverpool Housing Trust has abandoned 20 houses in the area be-
cause of persistent vandalism and break-ins. In stark contrast, the successful housing
co-ops, whether new build or rehab, stand like oases in a desert of dereliction and
run-down blocks of walk-up ﬂats (Towers 1995:230).
Such symptoms of “dilapidated dwelling” reveal a familiar story of post-industrial
inner-city decline across the global North. This paper delves into the history
and future prospects for regeneration of the particularly deprived neighbourhood
of Granby, Liverpool: the speciﬁc place described in this scene above. Liverpool’s
“inner-city problem”—persistent unemployment, deprivation, depopulation,
urban shrinkage, housing vacancy, dereliction and abandonment—has multiple
roots and complex contributory factors, not least its economic collapse as
a global seaport (Sykes et al. 2013). Conventional large-scale state and
market-led regeneration, most recently the Housing Market Renewal (HMR)
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Pathﬁnder programme, have largely failed to address these “wicked” problems
(Cocks and Couch 2012; Cole 2012). Mutual housing models like the co-ops cel-
ebrated above represent a potentially more effective, self-sustaining, and socially
just affordable housing tenure and regeneration solution to Liverpool’s inner-city
problem.
Building on arguments for the re-appropriation of our urban commons and the
search for alternatives growing in the cracks of capitalism (Blomley 2004b;
Chatterton 2010; Hodkinson 2012a, 2012b; Ward 1985), this paper explores
how mutual housing alternatives may be established in disinvested inner-city
neighbourhoods, to provide effective institutional blueprints for the democratic stew-
ardship of place. The main part of the paper is an in-depth case study of a campaign
in Granby, Liverpool, for a community land trust (CLT) to take back empty homes
under community ownership after decades of disinvestment and demolition plans.
Incorporated as a legal body in 2011, the “Granby Four Streets” CLT is an innovative
attempt to establish an urban CLT as a vehicle for neighbourhood regeneration; mak-
ing its mark at an opportune moment when large-scale demolition-and-rebuild
programmes, notably HMR, have prematurely drawn to a halt following the
ﬁnancial crisis and the imposition of austerity (Pinnegar 2012). After years of anti-
demolition campaigning by local residents and failed negotiations between the city
council, housing associations, and private developers—a deal has ﬁnally been
brokered to rehabilitate the four streets as a CLT-led vision.
The CLT vision is for an incremental, self-sustaining, and community-led ap-
proach to rehabilitation of housing, public space, and the derelict local high street
for new work and retail (Assemble 2013). Redevelopment is envisioned as a piece-
meal experiment in community self-help, drawing mostly on local skills and re-
sources, in stark contrast to the speculative development model (Tonkiss 2013).
The recent deal with the council gives the CLT ten properties to provide affordable
housing for local people in need as well as four corner buildings for community en-
terprise. Like co-ops, CLTs take land off the market into community ownership, but
distinguishing CLTs from other mutual models is the unique capability to separate
the ownership of land from the tenure of housing, thereby allowing various interest
groups to lease buildings and enabling a partnership approach in the difﬁcult task
of redeveloping derelict terraced housing. Granby CLT will lease some houses to its
funding and development partner for private rent/sale, as well as to a local eco-
housing co-op, the Northern Alliance Housing Cooperative (NAHC), who plan to
ecologically retroﬁt ﬁve houses as Terrace 21—“terraced housing for the 21st
century”—whilst the land itself remains in CLT ownership for long-term community
beneﬁt.
Granby Four Streets CLT is also unique for incorporating the innovative Mutual
Home Ownership Society (MHOS) model, which the NAHC co-op intends to use
as its legal tenure. Designed to work as a key complementary component of CLTs,
the MHOS model has been recently developed by CDS Cooperatives to circumvent
the problem of leaseholder enfranchisement that afﬂicts cooperative tenures
(Conaty et al. 2003). The MHOS leases buildings from the CLT, whose constitu-
tional covenants ultimately protect the land from private buy-outs. NAHC were
inspired by LILAC (Low Impact Living Affordable Community) in Leeds, the UK’s
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pioneering MHOS development (see Chatterton 2013). LILAC, however, is not
coupled with a CLT, so Granby Four Streets treads new ground as the demonstra-
tion project of the CLT-MHOS model.
The remainder of Granby Four Streets stock will be transferred to two local hous-
ing associations to provide “affordable rent” and shared ownership. Although some
activists feel this has diluted the original community vision, the CLT has nonetheless
been critically inﬂuential in bringing together more powerful development actors
around the shared goal of refurbishment for a mixed-tenure neighbourhood.
Moreover, the CLT seeks a greater stake in the area than indicated by ownership
alone: aspiring towards a “stewardship” role as the over-arching democratic
decision-making institution through which all other stakeholders and residents
may come together to negotiate and pool resources. This paper explores the chal-
lenges of institutionalisation and the promising potential of the CLT model for place
stewardship under conditions of austerity and long-term neighbourhood decline.
Originating in the 1960s American civil rights movement to promote black prop-
erty ownership, CLTs have since been utilised to address the pernicious effects of
absentee landlordism, speculative property development and gentriﬁcation
(DeFilippis 2004). CLTs have mostly been developed for the provision and local col-
lective control of affordable housing, with growing international application (Moore
and McKee 2012). But there are real prospects to use the model for neighbourhood
regeneration in the UK, following in the footsteps of the US, where CLTs are a rela-
tively well established and growing sector: ﬁrst institutionalised as amunicipal hous-
ing programme in Burlington, Vermont in the 1980s (DeFilippis 2004); and in the
1990s by grassroots inner-city community campaigns, notably Cooper Square in
New York (Angotti 2007) and Dudley Street in Boston (Medoff and Sklar 1994).
Granby Four Streets is part of an emerging urban CLT movement in the UK, con-
centrated in London and Liverpool. The ﬁrst urban CLT campaigns include: the
pioneering East London CLT established in 2007 by campaign organisation London
Citizens (Conaty and Large 2013); an unsuccessful tenant-led CLT campaign for
community ownership of an ex-council estate in Elephant and Castle in London
(DeFilippis and North 2004); a failed campaign to acquire empty homes in Little
Klondyke, Bootle, just north of Liverpool city centre; and Homebaked CLT in
Anﬁeld, Liverpool, a successful arts-led regeneration project for a CLT-owned coop-
erative bakery and affordable housing funded by Liverpool Biennial (Moore 2014).
In contrast to London, the Liverpool campaigns are motivated by the threat of dis-
investment and demolition in a shrinking city, rather than the pressures of specula-
tive investment, offering a potentially powerful antidote to problems of capital
ﬂight, public disinvestment, and neighbourhood decline. They are among the ﬁrst
attempts to successfully utilise the CLT model as an institutional vehicle for
neighbourhood rehabilitation, with an emphasis on collective control of assets that
contrasts with the narrower focus on housing affordability of the more established
rural CLT movement (Moore and McKee 2012).
The Granby campaign is distinct as a more grassroots initiative, having emerged
organically out of resident-led anti-demolition campaigning and activism to reclaim
the streets through guerrilla gardening. It shares many characteristics with historic
grassroots campaigns against demolition going back to the 1960s, such as
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Bonnington Square in London and Langrove Street in Liverpool during the 1980s,
involving occupations, squatting, and do-it-yourself rehabilitation (Towers 1995)—
part of a broader history of self-help housing (Mullins 2010). As a contemporary
struggle in this lineage, I hope the Granby case study might shed new light onto
these longstanding questions around how legally recognised forms of collective
land ownership can be successfully institutionalised out of grassroots activism.
In what follows I explore how the political campaign and formal body of Granby
CLT arose from more informal activism and everyday practices of “commoning”
(Linebaugh 2014). Although not enough to tackle the severe physical dilapidation,
this grassroots activism has nonetheless proved a critical precondition for the CLT’s
success in attracting vital support and funding to acquire empty homes from the
city council. The struggle to build trust with stakeholders has been especially
challenging due to a complex local history, but also, I argue, due to the ideological
dominance of private property relations within planning practice and property law,
which Singer (2000) describes as the “ownership model”. Before exploring the case
study, I ﬁrst conceptualise the CLT model in the context of mutual housing, the
commons, and the difﬁculties to institutionalisation posed by the ownership model.
The paper draws on ongoing Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)-
funded doctoral research aiming to understand how radical alternatives to
state/market provision of affordable housing have gained traction in the recent his-
tory of Liverpool: a city with a particularly rich legacy of mutual housing
experiments. The research ﬁrst identiﬁed several pivotal moments of radical exper-
imentation through an extensive desk-based historical study and ﬁve scoping inter-
views with “expert” informants, revealing Granby to be particularly signiﬁcant in an
emerging city-wide CLT movement. From mid-2013 to 2014, I visited Granby and
attended the monthly Cairns Street Market; attended community meetings; and
conducted 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key actors—activists, residents,
housing associations and council ofﬁcers, city politicians, and national policy experts.
Interviews were coded for common themes through iterative feedback between
conceptual concerns, empirical observation, and broader documentary analysis.
Community Land Trusts: Institutional Articulations of
the Commons?
CLTs are one particular model of housing tenure and land ownership within mutu-
alism (Hodkinson 2012b; Rodgers 1999; Rowlands 2009); part of a broader
movement for local autonomy and collective ownership of the means of social
reproduction (DeFilippis 2004). Mutual housing models provide a third option to
the familiar dualist categories of public/private sector, state/market provision—as
non-proﬁt, voluntary, community-led, place-basedmembership associations (Bailey
2012). The key function of mutual models—which range from Garden Cities and
tenant co-partnerships, through co-ownership societies, cooperatives, co-housing,
mutual homeownership societies, and community self-build—is their capacity to
“lock in” the value of land and assets, to protect commonwealth from private
expropriation (Conaty and Large 2013). This is where they resonate with the notion
of the commons.
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In (neo)Marxist thought, the commons stands at the beginning of capitalist his-
tory, triggered by initial acts of private enclosure, which formed the basis of primi-
tive accumulation and divorced people from the land and the means of sustaining
themselves (De Angelis 2006). This process continues today as accumulation-
by-dispossession: the “new urban enclosures” that privatise our “housing com-
mons”, those de-commodiﬁed dwelling spaces re-appropriated from the market
or protected from the full force of exchange relations (Hodkinson 2012a). Com-
mons are constituted by values and practices largely free from transactional market
relations: mutual aid, cooperation, solidarity. Commons are simultaneously mate-
rial resource and social practice, brought into dialectical unity through collective la-
bour, in what Linebaugh (2014) terms acts of “commoning”: (inter)active,
customary, cooperative social relations rooted in place.
Mutual housing models are imperfect institutional reﬂections or representations
of housing commons. For instance, the socio-material dialectic of the commons is
embodied in the CLT form, which describes both the social practices that constitute
the organisation and the physical land and assets to be commonly owned. Such
models seek to reconnect inhabitants with the means of social reproduction by
institutionalising some form of cooperative tenure, or “third estate”, in which mem-
ber tenants cooperatively own land and housing as collective landlords, therefore
transcending the landlord–tenant/freehold–leasehold binary that permeates British
property law (Rodgers 1999). This mitigates against the inherent alienation and ex-
ploitation of the tenant–landlord relation—which Colin Ward (1985) held responsi-
ble for the swift physical dilapidation of council housing estates. It does so by
providing “dweller control” (Ward 1974): autonomy over the activity of dwelling,
which should be seen as a verb as well as a noun, just as the commons is a social
activity as well as a material resource. By institutionalising a form of housing com-
mons, mutual housing alternatives have the potential to resolve the deprivation
and dispossession at the root of the inner-city problem.
Mutual housing models are necessarily impure pragmatic articulations in legal
form of an ideal-type commons, synthesising in complex hybrids different aspects
of public, private, and common ownership (Geisler and Daneker 2000). Actually
existing commons necessarily entail exclusion as “limited common property”:
“property held as a commons among the members of a group, but exclusively
vis-à-vis the outside world” (Rose 1998:132). Just as their relative autonomy is de-
pendent on external support, internal commoning practices are paradoxically de-
pendent on enclosure from the capitalist outside, thereby threatening to
reproduce the social exclusion of private property at a higher scale—a frequent
criticism of co-ops. This may be counteracted by the concept of “stewardship”,
the principle that civil title to land is never absolute, but rather held in trust with
duties of care, social responsibility, and accountability in serving the common inter-
ests of fellow and future users (Geisler and Daneker 2000). It is morally derived
from the idea that property values are only partly “earned” by the labour and in-
vestment of the individual owner/occupant, the larger part ﬂowing from what
Davis (2010) calls the “unearned social increment”: collective value creation ema-
nating from countless contributing actions, transactions, and public investments
from local to global.
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Stewardship is the ethical principle underpinning the rejection of the individual
right to proﬁt in the CLT model (Davis 2010). This unique property regime takes
land off the market into local democratic control and, unlike other mutual models,
separates the ownership of land from that of buildings, which are leased to mem-
bers, allowing various housing tenures to co-exist on CLT land. First, this effectively
captures the value of land locally—anchoring increasingly mobile capital in place
and preventing its extraction—for long-term community beneﬁt and economic se-
curity against the threat of ﬁnancial speculation, public disinvestment or displace-
ment (DeFilippis 2004; Davis 2010); thereby challenging neoliberal ﬁnancialisation
of land by blocking the rights of individuals to proﬁt on their share of equity (Blomley
2004b). Second, this enables “stewardship” of the land for future as well as current
inhabitants; overseen by a democratically elected tripartite trust, whose rotating
board representatives are equally split between member-residents, expert stake-
holders, and the wider community (Davis 2010). The concept of stewardship used
here refers speciﬁcally to the outward-looking capacity of the CLT model to work
for community beneﬁt over mere member-resident beneﬁt, by including broader
stakeholder expertise in the democratic management of decommodiﬁed land and
assets through a trust structure accountable to wider publics; to transcend the
exclusivity of ownership through more inclusive access and representation of pres-
ent, possible, and future user interests of CLT-governed space.
Between the Boundaries of the Ownership Model:
Challenges for Institutionalisation
The challenge of institutionalisation of our housing commons is made especially
problematic for two reasons. First, articulation of the commons as property rights
appears conceptually impossible and politically self-defeating. Private property
rights legitimate purely passive individual claims to own and divest of land irrespec-
tive of common use, as an abstract deed of entitlement backed up by the state
(Singer 2000). Commoning, by contrast, is a horizontal practice with customary
rights legitimated autonomously through the very act of their mutual negotiation:
a relational claim to shared space justiﬁed immanently as an active form of human
“doing” (Rose 1994). Articulation as legal rights threatens to codify, ossify, and un-
dermine into passive and alienated relations the highly active, interactive, and
organic relations of the commons.
Second, the existing hegemonic system of private property rights—the ownership
model—is extremely hostile to other forms of ownership, especially the commons
(Singer 2000). The ownership model is the legal foundation of (neo)liberalism, a
political discourse and economic project based fundamentally on the institution
of private property, rooted in separation and abstraction (Blomley 2004b). It invests
absolute control over a clearly delineated space in a single identiﬁable private
owner, whose formal legal title alone bestows entitlement (Singer 2000). It pro-
motes the legal separation of people—between owners/non-owners—and the spa-
tial separation of land, constructing exclusionary walls of capitalist enclosure. By
marking territory with visible spatial boundaries, property becomes a “spatialised
thing” abstracted from its context, devoid of social relations (Blomley 2004b). This
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ideological cloaking of property helps make land appear appropriable, transferable,
and alienable from its social context. The “right to transfer” and the “right to spec-
ulate” in order to proﬁt from property appear as naturalised conditions of land it-
self, making non-alienable common ownership seem like non-property (Singer
2000). The powerful protection of exchange rights under the ownership model al-
lows the enclosure of urban space into an alienable object, and the extraction of so-
cially produced surplus value. This is the legal DNA of what Lefebvre (2002:305)
terms “abstract space”: “a naked empty social space stripped bare of symbols”; a
globalised net of homogenous quantitative equivalence facilitating exchange rela-
tions and erasing the qualitative difference and depth of “lived space”.
Neoliberal hegemony is partly maintained by the simpliﬁed appeal of the
ownership model, whose clear legal “settlement” promises certainty, security,
and legibility in otherwise ﬂuid, complex, and contentious social relations (Blomley
2004b). By obscuring the pluralism of property relations and the inherent multiplic-
ity of claims with a neat categorisation of ordering dualisms (Singer 2000)—public/
private; owner/non-owner; landlord/tenant—this hides and silences those claims
not deemed “proper” forms of (private) “proprietorship” (Rose 1998). Enforcing
this divided settlement—between visibility/invisibility; legitimacy/illegitimacy;
inclusion/exclusion—is the powerful political vocabulary of property rights: enforce-
able claims to use or beneﬁt from particular property, sanctioned by the sover-
eignty of the state. It is only through their translation into legally enforceable
property rights that moral common claims gain necessary recognition, protection,
and security—an important traverse to be carefully crossed for the long-term sur-
vival of collective dweller control.
All efforts to institutionalise mutual housing models must contend with a hostile
legal landscape polarised between the public and private realm, and geared to-
wards private homeownership. British property law acknowledges only two types
of tenure, inherited from feudalism: freehold and leasehold—landlord/tenant—
treating mutual members essentially as either tenants or part-owners (Rodgers
1999). Ironically, leaseholder enfranchisement legislation passed in 1967 to protect
tenants from ruthless landlords empowers co-op members to buy out their equity
share, thereby threatening the re-imposition of private property relations (Conaty
and Large 2013). The co-op movement is lobbying for legislative tenure reform
to include a “third estate” (Rodgers 1999): the legal protection required to sustain
common property relations over time. Each new mutual model can be seen as the
latest historical iteration in institutional vehicles designed to negotiate greater legal
protection of the housing commons against enclosure.
Our emerging era of “austerity urbanism” (Peck 2012) has not only compounded
the inner-city problem, but also opened up new opportunities for grassroots
groups to resist urban enclosure and reclaim space for social reproduction in the in-
terstices of the post-crash city. This is testiﬁed by the recent growth and research
interest in new forms of grassroots urbanisms, variously preﬁxed as “guerrilla”, “in-
surgent”, “everyday”, “do-it-yourself”, “interstitial” and “makeshift’ (Hou 2010;
Iveson 2013; Tonkiss 2013). These practices might include community gardens, oc-
cupations, squats, co-ops, and alternative gift economies, and have been
characterised as “actually existing commons” (Eizenberg 2012), growing in the
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“cracks” of the dominant development model (Tonkiss 2013), and pre-ﬁguratively
re-imagining urban life as an urban commons (Chatterton 2010). Part of this
emphasis on the informal, the temporary, the insurgent, and the micro-scale is
no doubt a response to the hegemonic power of the ownership model: the need
to form “extra-legal counter-publics” that “operate within legal shadows” to
“unsettle” the neoliberal settlement (Blomley 2004b:18). By working silently to
reclaim common space between the public/private legal-spatial boundaries in
the ownership model, grassroots urbanisms thrive on their invisibility to the
system (Iveson 2013). However, by the same token, they are often too informal,
ephemeral, disconnected, and localised to properly challenge deeper structural
issues to effect lasting urban transformation.
Indeed, the growing literature on alternatives or “alterity”—“the possibility of an
economic and political ‘other’” (Fuller et al. 2010:4)—highlights the need for some
degree of socioeconomic self-sufﬁciency, or relative autonomy, from mainstream
capitalist state structures, through the construction of alternative “circuits of value”.
Indeed, the long-term success of insurgent attempts to (re)appropriate urban space
for control over the means of social reproduction depends on the capacity to exer-
cise collective autonomous control over land and resources (DeFilippis 2004).
Paradoxically, under the ownership model, relative local autonomy can only be se-
cured and protected through existing forms of legally sanctioned sovereignty over
space, which means actively negotiating and making “deals” with the state and
market for access to land and property rights.
Indeed, recent research on self-help housing recognises that the ability to help
oneself “from within” is paradoxically dependent on “help from without”, from vi-
tal external sources of support (Moore and Mullins 2013). Many recent self-help
housing initiatives to rehabilitate empty homes for community use have relied on
the government’s empty homes grants and campaign support from the Empty
Homes Agency (Mullins 2010). This is part of the new localism agenda and the
UK coalition government’s “Big Society”—of neighbourhood planning and com-
munity rights to buy/bid/build—in which community asset transfer/acquisition
now enjoys cross-party political support (Bailey 2012). In this context, CLTs and
self-help housing have received renewed policy interest as part of a growing “third
sector” of community-based organisations and social enterprises increasingly
turned to by the state to manage assets and deliver public services and regeneration
at the neighbourhood scale.
However, British policy interest in the CLT model predates these trends, ﬁrst
imported from the US in the 1990s by British advocates seeking to resolve issues
of rural housing affordability, and used by communities in the Scottish Highlands
to regain control of assets from quasi-feudal landlords (Moore and McKee 2012).
The government-funded National CLT Demonstration Programme from 2006 to
2008 piloted 14 CLT projects (Aird 2009), leading to the formation in 2010 of the
National CLT Network, an umbrella organisation that connects and supports mem-
ber CLTs (National CLT Network 2015). Whilst essential for growth, state support
presents the danger of co-optation and dilution of the radical land reform potential
and local autonomy of CLTs. The contradictions of institutionalisation, in becoming
“state-like”, are reﬂected in the tensions between “scaling up” and “going viral” as
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alternate forms of replication (Moore and Mullins 2013). Institutionalisation is a del-
icate balancing act of giving legal and procedural structure to informal grassroots
practices without losing the organic social energy and political vision motivating
unique projects. The remainder of the paper explores how the power of the owner-
ship model presents complex challenges for the practical institutionalisation of
Granby CLT in Liverpool.
Liverpool: A Laboratory for Innovation in Mutual
Housing Experiments?
The Granby campaign is situated in Liverpool’s ongoing process of economic and
social transformation. From its meteoric rise to world city and leading global sea-
port in the nineteenth century to its equally dramatic fall from grace following
the decimation of its raison d’être, the shipping trade, Liverpool has been an “out-
rider” of the post-industrial transition, suffering from some of the worst effects of in-
dustrial growth and decline, and at the forefront of urban policy innovations to
tackle its persistent housing crisis (Nevin 2010; Sykes et al. 2013). Liverpool was
the ﬁrst British city to build public housing in 1869 in response to squalid “back-
to-back” tenement housing conditions, later pioneering the UK’s ﬁrst resident-led
housing co-ops, and the largest community-led housing trust operating today,
the Eldonians (McBane 2008). With the rapid loss of its maritime economic base—
capital ﬂight, disinvestment, and unemployment—Liverpool’s population halved
in under half a century, from a peak of over 800,000 in the 1930s to around
400,000 by 2001 (Cocks and Couch 2012). The inner-city areas of Victorian ter-
races, once housing thousands of dockers and their families, were disproportion-
ately hit by the decline, with severe depopulation, dereliction, and deprivation:
by the 1990s some of these neighbourhoods had vacancy rates of over 30% (Nevin
2010).
The post-war municipal policy response to poor housing conditions was large-
scale demolition, or “slum clearance” programmes with around 160,000 inner-city
residents decanted to new towns and estates on the metropolitan periphery (Sykes
et al. 2013). This exacerbated inner-city decline by removing working populations
from economically fragile areas, thereby designing-in-dereliction. At the epicentre
of these clearances is Granby, a particularly deprived inner-city ward in the south-
central postcode of Liverpool 8, renowned for its rich cultural history, ethnic diver-
sity, and faded architectural grandeur (Merriﬁeld 2002). Granby is home to one of
the UK’s oldest black communities—a long and complicated history entwined with
place that reaches back to Liverpool’s roots in Atlantic trade—and witnessed one of
its most virulent and violently repressed riots in living memory, against poverty,
institutional racism, and police brutality (Frost and Phillips 2011). Not only did
the “1981 Uprising” imprint the area with a perceived social stigma—thereby rein-
forcing decline—it also created mutual mistrust between city authorities and local
residents, some of whom believe the council has engaged in a deliberate pro-
gramme of managed decline (resident interviews 2014).
Yet Granby’s decline has provoked community resistance and social innovation
through mutual alternatives. The Shelter Neighbourhood Action Programme
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(SNAP), the pioneering action research project run by the homelessness campaign
organisation Shelter from 1969 to 1972, was set up to resolve Granby’s endemic
deprivation and appalling “slum” housing conditions (McConaghy 1972). SNAP
helped establish the country’s ﬁrst rehabilitation housing cooperatives, in turn in-
spiring a ﬂourishing new-build housing co-op movement in the 1970s—leaving a
legacy of over 50 co-ops across Liverpool (Lusk 1998). This was motivated by wide-
spread agitation for better housing conditions among residents living in insanitary
and poorly maintained terraces and tenements; driven by resistance to displace-
ment and community fragmentation (interviews 2013). Colin Ward’s (1974) radi-
cal ideas for “dweller control” were inﬂuential in the development of the Weller
Streets in Granby, the UK’s ﬁrst truly resident-led fully mutual new-build co-op
(McDonald 1986). The subsequent rhizomatic spread of new build co-ops across
Merseyside was deeply rooted in an innovative programme of tenant education
in cooperative principles, architectural design, and housing development regula-
tions (interviews 2013). It was spearheaded by the secondary co-op development
organisation, CDS, working with local architectural ﬁrms to innovate participatory
design methods that enabled working class residents to design, develop, and man-
age their own homes in an unprecedented process of collective dweller control.
The exceptionally generous funding regime and supportive infrastructure of this
period facilitated the growth of co-ops as well as housing associations, which have
since expanded to become the most powerful property development players in
Granby today (Lusk 1998). Indeed, Liverpool’s large professionalised housing asso-
ciations started out as small non-proﬁt charitable trusts and co-op agencies. The
largest association operating in Granby today, Plus Dane, is the direct heir of
CDS, which it absorbed in the 1990s. Subsequent political opposition during the
1980s from the Militant-dominated Labour council threatened the co-op move-
ment with “municipalisation” and extinction, yet also galvanised other community
groups, such as the Eldonians, into action (Frost and North 2013). Neoliberal
reforms have since put an end to co-op development, reﬂecting broader trends
towards the privatisation of public housing, through Right to Buy and stock transfer
of council housing to an increasingly market-led housing association sector
(Ginsburg 2005). Whilst the co-op movement has been constrained from further
development by neoliberal policies it has nonetheless opened up the political space
between public and private to think creatively about how to resuscitate a problem-
atic area like Granby.
Granby’s ageing pre-1919 housing stock has long passed its planned physical
lifecycle—despite council-funded refurbishments—and worsening socio-economic
conditions have conspired to create a downward spiral of decline and dilapidation
(Merriﬁeld 2002). Post-war planning mistakes contributed to this decline:
redirecting and building over the top end of the once-bustling neighbourhood
shopping avenue, Granby Street, thereby severing Granby from its vital connection
with the city centre as an arterial through-ﬂow for urban activity and consumption
(housing ofﬁcer interview 2013). Further council-led demolition-and-rebuild
programmes attempted to tackle the dereliction, replacing most terraces with
lower density estates, leaving only four original streets, known as the “Granby
Triangle”. These four streets map neatly onto the original SNAP boundaries,
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suggesting that early rehabilitation efforts have been relatively successful. From the
1990s, the council began buying up housing association properties—emptying
them of their tenants—and offering market prices to the small minority of remaining
owner-occupiers. A vocal group of homeowners, organised as Granby Residents’
Association, refused to move and campaigned to save the streets. Described by an
ex-council ofﬁcer as the “ﬁnal battleground” (interview 2013), these four streets
became centre-stage to a bitter conﬂict fought between the council and the small
minority of remaining residents. The resistance attracted the support of national lobby
organisations Empty Homes Agency and SAVE Britain’s Heritage, helping raise the
media proﬁle of the campaign to rehabilitate rather than demolish empty terraces.
Conﬂict intensiﬁed with the commencement of HMR Pathﬁnders, the controver-
sial £2.3 billion national programme rolled out from 2003 to 2011 across nine
de-industrialised northern English inner-cities, notably Liverpool, whose city council
helped pioneer and lobby for government funding (Cole 2012; Nevin 2010). HMR
Pathﬁnders aimed for long-term structural change in failing housing markets
through part-refurbishment and large-scale demolition of “obsolete” Victorian
terraces and replacement with a more “sustainable” mix of tenures (Webb
2010). Part of the mixed communities agenda, HMR has been critiqued as state-
led gentriﬁcation, remaking place in the image of a new target middle class
population (Allen 2008), and for conceiving lived neighbourhoods as abstract
sub-regional markets, conceptualising the “city-as-property” over the “city-as-
inhabited” (Pinnegar 2012). From a Lefebvrean perspective (Wilson 2013), HMR
represents the domination of “abstract space”, based on exchange value, over
the use values of “lived space”.
Liverpool’s HMR Pathﬁnder, “NewHeartlands”, earmarked around 70,000 houses
in an inner-city ring for demolition/refurbishment, initially forecasting £3 billion
public/private investment until planned completion in 2018 (Nevin 2010). Liver-
pool was divided into four “Zones of Opportunity”—or “ZOOs”—each appointed
a single preferred developer to work in partnership with the area’s leading housing
association, and accountable to a governing board of stakeholders, which, unlike
previous regeneration programmes, included no local resident representation
(Cole 2012). In a tragic repeat of history, ZOOs mapped closely onto the 1960s
slum clearance areas: a landscape witness to more than two generations of regen-
eration (Sykes et al. 2013). This relentless focus on one monolithic solution to
complex neighbourhood contexts—with little opportunity for piecemeal community
projects—demonstrates the enduring inﬂuence of the ownership model over regen-
eration thinking in Liverpool.
The failure of HMR to resolve the inner-city problem—at least in part attribut-
able to the premature withdrawal of state funding mid-way through its planned
lifecycle in 2011 in the context of post-crash austerity—is now all too evident in
the swathes of vacant land and empty tinned-up properties across HMR
clearance zones. In Granby, HMR did fund signiﬁcant refurbishment but most
of the area was left to crumble into dereliction, still in council ownership but
without funds for either demolition or refurbishment. Today, there are 128
vacant boarded-up houses and shops, leaving only around 60 households still
lived in (see Figure 1).
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Growing Granby from the Grassroots
Long before the withdrawal of HMR, the remaining residents in Granby had already
begun to resist its adverse effects—properties boarded up, streets collecting rubbish,
attracting vandals, houses literally falling in—by cleaning pavements, clearing rub-
bish, and reclaiming the derelict streetscape as a community garden. They placed
potted plants and garden furniture out on pavements, painted derelict house front-
ages with murals, and grew plants and ﬂowers up buildings (see Figure 2). Much of
this was preceded by a council-funded adult education programme on ecology and
gardening called “Growing Granby”, which entrusted a nearby vacant plot to local
residents via a short-term lease by housing association Liverpool Mutual Homes for a
community garden, as well as inspiring more radical ideas for a “DIY People Plan”
reimagining Granby as a “backyard commons” (Grant 2011). Yet the insurgent acts
of guerrilla gardening that have transformed the Granby Triangle into what is
known as the “Green Triangle” sprang forth more spontaneously from residents
Figure 1: Map showing vacancies in Granby Four Streets (source: Assemble 2013;
reproduced here with permission)
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themselves—distinguished from “Growing Granby” “because we work in public
space, not behind railings on private land” (activist interview 2014).
Working without permission from the council, these guerrilla gardeners engage
in everyday acts of “commoning”: bringing the domestic, intimate spaces of their
homes out into the public streetscape, sharing it with others, and creating a
distinctive hybrid community garden that mixes domesticity, privacy, communality,
and public openness, bearing the hallmarks of an “actually existing commons”
(Eizenberg 2012). This blurs the boundaries of public and private space,
representing what Blomley (2004b:15) calls “creative acts of resistant remapping”
of the ofﬁcial abstract map of the ownership model. In blurring these boundaries
such insurgent acts are informal and unrecognised forms of ownership—an “imag-
ined proprietorship” (Blomley 2004a) or an “un-real estate” (Rose 1994), highlight-
ing the organic and active aspects of ownership as a process of human “doing”
(Rose 1994). This is a stark refutation of the ownership model and its insistence that
only two moments of action matter: acquisition and transfer (Blomley 2004a).
Green Triangle commoning also cuts across political and social distinctions among
residents, who have forged common bonds despite diverse worldviews through
communal cleaning, planting, and tending (activist interview 2014). However,
these practices are largely conﬁned to a small number of remaining homeowners,
highlighting how “commoning is exclusive inasmuch as it requires participation.
It must be entered into… This is why we speak neither of rights nor obligations sep-
arately” (Linebaugh 2014:15). There is a need for the Granby CLT to seek greater
Figure 2: Green Triangle guerrilla gardening (source: photos by author)
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inclusion of wider publics and more direct participation of other residents for dem-
ocratic legitimacy.
One way progress is being made in this direction is through the monthly street
market, which, since its inception off the springboard of guerrilla gardening, has
become a symbol of resistance and community hub for small-scale economic and
cultural activity—a local legend, attracting over 200 people over a day from all over
Liverpool and beyond (see Figure 3). Once a month, the local community comes
together in celebration—setting up stalls selling everything from everyday essentials
to artwork—with live performances from local musicians, diverse cuisine cooked on-
site, and dancing amongst the medley of shoppers, sellers, and wanderers. This do-
it-yourself experiment is a tentative move towards constructing a relatively
autonomous “circuit of value” (Fuller et al. 2010), with plans to acquire four corner
buildings on Granby Street as community-owned enterprises, studios, cafes, and
shops as part of its regeneration into the bustling shopping avenue it once was.
These do-it-yourself developments have both progressive and regressive
potential, containing the contradictions of what Tonkiss (2013) calls “interstitial
urbanism”. Their creative and pioneering endeavour to take back streets left to de-
cay by austerity politics is both a crack in the ownership model, preﬁguring an
actually existing commons, and simultaneously an unwitting agent of austerity ur-
banism, taking up the slack in the paralysed development model and ﬁlling the gap
left by the retreating state to productively reuse derelict housing when all else has
failed. Granby’s Green Triangle thus fulﬁls an ambiguous double-role, vis-à-vis
“roll-with-it” neoliberalism (Keil 2009)—the normalisation in everyday life of entre-
preneurialism, creativity, self-reliance, ﬂexibility, and do-it-yourself initiative as a
means to facilitate capital accumulation. Green Triangle activists, mostly women as-
sociated with the city’s artistic milieu, enact a certain bohemian habitus which may
act to alienate or exclude other social groups from the area, and which plays into
“creative class” politics and city branding, potentially planting the seeds for green
gentriﬁcation as Liverpool’s economy recovers.
Indeed, this has attracted the interest of other creative types in the area. The
Northern Alliance Housing Cooperative (NAHC)—a small group of idealistic young
professionals, designers, and postgraduate students living locally and looking for
empty homes to retroﬁt into mutualised eco-homes—was established in direct
Figure 3: Granby Four Streets market (source: photos by author)
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response to the Green Triangle. NAHC’s founder was originally inspired by the cre-
ative endeavour evident in the “beautiful” transformation of the four streets to ex-
plore the idea of a co-op and present it to residents (NAHC interview 2013).
Likewise, the ex-housing ofﬁcer who became Granby’s community organiser,
helping channel divergent creative energies into a common vision, offered his ser-
vices after ﬁrst being seduced by the green activism. Perhaps the most vital support
came from a private social ﬁnance company, HD Social Investments (HDSI), person-
ally backed by what CLT members describe as “the mystery millionaire” (activist in-
terviews 2013). This former stockbroker from Jersey had sent his researcher out
around the country to search for a socially worthwhile project in which to invest
ﬁnance capital for a small return—described by a CLT activist as “philanthropy at
5%”—and came across Granby through auspicious links with SAVE Britain’s
Heritage. Piquing his interest in Granby was not just the Victorian architectural as-
sets found right across inner-city Liverpool, but the proactive do-it-yourself ethos
and social entrepreneurialism of Granby residents breathing life back into their
faded grandeur.
Conﬂicts of interest between the community and the private investor may well
play out in due course, but so far HDSI have provided crucial ﬁnancial support: con-
siderable low-interest loans as well as the funding and expertise required to
successfully apply for several grants, such as Nationwide Foundation and govern-
ment’s Empty Homes funds, each worth £125,000 (interviews 2014). Working with
CLT members, HDSI has also commissioned a persuasive design statement from the
innovative London-based architecture collective, Assemble, which sets out a practi-
cal plan to acquire and refurbish 27 of the 128 vacant, boarded-up empty homes in
the four streets as a mix of affordable homes, as part of a long-term vision to reha-
bilitate the other empty homes and revive the neighbourhood’s economic back-
bone, Granby Street (Assemble 2013). Under the creative direction of Assemble,
the CLT is working with HDSI and NAHC as joint partners to realise this vision—each
hoping to take on properties and manage them as different tenures—but with the
CLT as the ultimate umbrella institution under which all other partners and legal
ownership of the land are organised.
A large part of the broad community mandate for the CLT model is its capacity to
incorporate the co-op and other tenure types, integrating divergent property
interests, and the democratic trust governance structure, enabling wider stakeholder
participation for long-term place stewardship for community beneﬁt over resident-
member beneﬁt. CLT membership extends throughout the L8 postal district, beyond
the immediate Granby Triangle, and so the CLT recognises its scalar contributory
relationship with surrounding urban areas. Members meet regularly to discuss CLT
affairs and democratically elect representatives onto the trust management board,
whose membership of 12 periodically rotates, with tripartite representation of mem-
ber residents, the wider local community, and key stakeholders. The latter third
includes representatives from Plus Dane and Liverpool Mutual Homes, the council,
as well as crucial ﬁnancial and technical expertise in development. The diverse black
community are actively engaged as stakeholders: the Men and Women’s Somali
Groups each have board representation, as does the Steve Biko housing association,
established in 1982 to provide local black community access to social housing in the
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context of racial discrimination, and now helping develop and deliver the CLT
housing allocations policy. Tenants displaced by HMR are represented in the wider
community third, to be afforded a “right to return” in CLT housing allocations; but
it remains unclear how the very limited number of houses will be fairly distributed
among the much larger number of evicted tenants.
Indeed, such apparent inclusivity is not without internal tensions: the CLT is
marked by what many describe as tense politics. The local black community has
a long historical attachment to Granby, which, coupled with perceived injustices
of persecution, produces a strong sense of place entitlement. Emerging conﬂicts
between longstanding resident homeowners and NAHC newcomers, who have
nonetheless lived in the surrounding area for many years, reﬂect opposing ethical
perspectives on rights to place: personal historical attachments to place versus
productive contribution through active improvement. NAHC members bring
professional skills in ecology, architecture, and planning to the campaign pro-
cess—critical in persuading the council to even consider the CLT idea—and claim
inclusion on the basis of their innovative project to retro-ﬁt ﬁve of the empty
homes into cutting-edge eco-houses to be managed cooperatively through a
MHOS. These claims to expertise, however, may also act to exclude, and efforts
need to be made to engage other residents in a more mutual and open learning
process.
Trust: The Clue’s in the Title!
Gaining the support of the council, as the primary gatekeeper, is essential for suc-
cessful acquisition. From the council perspective, the burden of proof lies ﬁrmly
on the CLT to demonstrate its social responsibility to manage assets, and to con-
vince local government of the merits of transferring a large quantity of public assets
to an untested community-owned organisation. A local architect/NAHC/CLT activ-
ist states the problem:
We have to prove that we can do something before people trust, because that issue of
trust goes both ways as well… local residents don’t trust the city council, the city council
don’t trust local residents to do anything other than kick up a fuss … Hopefully that
would get easier … breaking down the barriers that have been built up over the last
ten years with HMR … and a certain fear at the council level … just trusting people to
do the best for the neighbourhood doesn’t really seem to be there. I think it’s there
now with some of the members but it’s still not there with all of the ofﬁcers; that’s an
institutional culture thing, which I expect takes decades to change.
Trust is the magic ingredient holding the entire CLT endeavour together. HMR in
Granby stands at the end of a long complicated history of mutual mistrust between
council and community, ﬁrst ﬂaring in the 1981 Uprising and now threatening to
paralyse collaborative decision-making over the future of the area. Residents feel a
powerful sense of resentment and injustice that their homes and community have
been “stolen” from them by the council (resident interviews 2013)—an opposi-
tional position posing additional barriers to negotiating a mutually satisfactory
solution.
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The absence of trust is evident in the council’s decision, in the wake of HMR’s can-
cellation, to tender the four streets for “best value” bids, entering into year-long ne-
gotiations with a private development company, Leader One, whilst CLT ideas were
side-lined. Such a competitive logic—pitting parties against each other—is a manifes-
tation of the ownership model, formalised in the 1980s by compulsory competitive
tendering policies (Hodkinson 2011). This winner-takes-all approach is attractive to
councils who can settle a deﬁnite contract with one single responsible and liable
owner, but which imposes severe entry barriers for smaller community-led projects
without the resources or expertise of private companies. It is also risky: the Leader
One deal collapsed under unreasonable demands for the council to underwrite
any losses, the admirable refusal to effectively privatise proﬁt and socialise risk.
During this process, activists approached Leader One to propose a partnership,
which the company brieﬂy entertained. An NAHC founder tells of how it was Leader
One, during negotiations with the council, who ﬁrst suggested to him that “the
council isn’t interested in having a cooperative there”, explaining that “if you can
make it like some kind of ownership thing, then we might be a bit more interested”;
persuading NAHC to pursue MHOS as a more palatable mutual solution than a
conventional co-op. The preference for mutual homeownership over a traditional
co-op is as much about the perceived fear and mistrust of common property re-
gimes that sit outside the familiar categories of the ownership model—assuaged
by the semantic association with individual “homeownership”—as it is with the ac-
tual workings of the MHOS model itself, which are more akin to a co-op than its
name suggests (Chatterton 2013). This is where its power lies in playing the lan-
guage game of private property rights, and potentially using this brand advantage
as a way to leverage support from otherwise sceptical gatekeepers.
It was only the austerity-driven failure of Leader One that eventually turned atten-
tion towards the CLT vision: the only viable option left on the table. A change in
council mind-set was already evident in its self-help “homesteading” plan. Empty
Homes funding has been made available to sell empties for £1 to individuals with
local connections to restore through do-it-yourself labour on the proviso that cer-
tain conditions are met, such as living in the house for at least ﬁve years without
sub-letting (Crookes and Greenhalgh 2013). Such a piecemeal approach is perhaps
too individualised to effectively tackle a large area of empties, having only been
tested with a handful of properties in Granby. Yet it signals a break with the domi-
nant speculative development model.
CLT partners have taken inspiration from this self-help method to come up with
“community homesteading” (activist interview 2014). They plan to develop CLT
houses on a one-by-one basis, drawing on the do-it-yourself self-build techniques
of homesteading but employing resources and labour from across the entire
community. They hope to establish relationships with local colleges to help train
young people in craft and construction in return for lower labour costs, thereby
strengthening ﬁnancial viability and embedding development in the local econ-
omy. This disrupts both the spatial and temporal logic of the neoliberal urban de-
velopment process: the “sharp-in/sharp-out” model, which “assumes a division
between the makers and the users of space” in the fallacy of the “end-user” (Tonkiss
2013:320), and alienates existing residents from the process, whose lives are put on
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hold or displaced entirely. Community homesteading, by contrast, transcends this
division through a more socially participatory, temporally incremental, albeit spa-
tially piecemeal approach towards securing collective dweller control.
Conclusion: The Contradictions of Institutionalisation
This paper has advanced two opposing imaginaries of housing ownership and
neighbourhood regeneration. The ﬁrst describes the dominant ownership model,
which sees ownership and dwelling as externally related, with property appearing sep-
arable from its social context, enabling abstraction and exchange on the globalmarket,
as a form of abstract space. The alternative is a utopian imaginary of internal relations,
in which the social and material aspects of dwelling are dialectically entwined.
Whereas the former is founded on a disconnection between producer/consumer—
the alienation of landlord/tenant, owner/occupier—the latter reconnects maker with
user, developer with dweller, through collective dweller control. Active doing is em-
phasized over passive entitlement. This perspective materialises as a collective self-
help regeneration method, drawing on do-it-yourself techniques and practices of
commoning—tentatively expressed in Granby’s guerrilla gardening and community
homesteading. By virtue of the self-securing nature of British, or Anglo-Saxon, pri-
vate property rights, common ownership must be actively and creatively claimed,
through unconventional insurgent tactics that work beyond the law. Granby’s
grassroots practices are essentially “imagined”—but politically powerful—claims
for a common right to place. Without licence, residents have acted upon public
space as if it were their own: actively resisting managed decline to “take ownership”
and reclaim lived space from the abstract space of HMR. However, the long-term
survival and viability of collective control over the means of social reproduction is
paradoxically dependent on state support to authorise and ﬁnance community
acquisition of land and recognise its legal ownership.
Actually existing commons are neither free from contradictions nor immune to
human power relations. They construct their own walls within—and boundaries
without—as necessarily exclusive enclosures that protect against more pernicious
enclosures. Mutual housing models are essentially pragmatic compromises made
with a hostile legal landscape that attempt to express mutual relations in institu-
tional form. As forms of housing, they are complex hybrid social spaces, combining
the necessary privacy of the home with more cooperative social relations for the
democratic governance of land. The great strength of the CLT model is its ﬂexibility
in the face of hegemony: its incorporation of multiple tenures enabling diverse
interest groups, stakeholders, and sources of support to govern together through
trust. This emphasis on stewardship over ownership—community beneﬁt over
mere member beneﬁt—is a promising avenue towards overcoming the inherently
exclusionary dynamics of housing commons. The political potential of steward-
ship to transcend the gap between common ownership and public trust lies in this
capacity of the CLT structure to incorporate wider publics in democratic decision-
making; acting as an outward-looking counterbalance to the necessarily inward-
looking closure of housing commons. Further empirical research is required as
Granby CLT develops to assess this potential and investigate the actual effects of
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governance practices, particularly housing allocation decisions, on distributive
justice and social relations.
The Granby campaign is a novel experiment in the CLT-MHOS model and com-
munity homesteading; but to be more than just an isolated one-off experiment,
the issue of replication is fundamental. Granby’s success so far appears to stem
from contextual particularities peculiar to time and place: chance encounters with
co-op activists, community organisers, and social investors; the unique local history
of collective action and innovation in cooperative housing; and the window of op-
portunity opened up by austerity urbanism. It was only through the moratorium
placed on monolithic demolition-and-rebuild schemes that the CLT became attrac-
tive to Liverpool policymakers—a last-ditch option when all other standard ap-
proaches had been exhausted. Austerity also demands funding from sources
other than the state, in this case from the HDSI “mystery millionaire”. Such an
emerging role for social investment and the reliance on private capital raises many
questions over the accountability, viability, and replicability of such schemes, per-
haps made too vulnerable to the whims of philanthropic capital. However, by un-
derstanding the socio-political dynamics of ground-breaking projects ﬁrst tested
out under such extreme conditions, I hope to have revealed insights for the political
potential of mutual housing projects in other contexts, with similar catalytic
conditions.
The myriad preconditions for urban CLT campaigns to re-appropriate empty
homes for community use exist in countless other places, and we can see seeds tak-
ing root in similar ex-HMR inner-city contexts, for instance in Middlesbrough
(MCLT 2015). Lessons can be learnt from an unsuccessful campaign in Little
Klondyke, Bootle, just north of Liverpool, which, despite sharing many characteris-
tics with Granby—deprived ex-HMR inner-city neighbourhood of derelict terraced
housing whose residents fought a bitter battle against demolition—nonetheless
failed to gain the vital consent of the local authority to sign off on an otherwise
successful grant application for some £5 million from DCLG’s Empty Homes
Community programme, secured with the help of the National CLT Network, the
Empty Homes Agency, and SAVE Britain’s Heritage (activist interview 2013). Sefton
Council’s refusal to support the funding programme may indicate entrenched
ideological beliefs in the ownership model, but may also reside in the lack of local
participation in the campaign, struggling to ﬁnd the minimum 12 residents
required to constitute a functional CLT board. Such a contrasting story shows the
essential ingredient in Granby’s success to be the dynamic and creative grassroots
activity that ﬁrst spurred others to seriously consider the merits of the CLT. It was
only through this performative demonstration to city authorities and potential
allies of a local collective will to take on the stewardship of a disinvested space
that vital funding streams and development expertise were ever secured. A
fundamental barrier is therefore the considerable burden on local volunteering
energies—residents’ proactive capacities, skills, and motivations to engage in com-
plicated campaign and development processes—and their deeply problematic un-
even spatial distribution; raising serious concerns for the viability and systematic
replication of such projects, especially in the poorest neighbourhoods where they
are most needed.
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The challenge of replication and institutionalisation hinges on this tension: be-
tween, on the one hand, inspiring, mobilising, and sustaining the intense political
campaign energy and grassroots practices of commoning that are the lifeblood of
common ownership institutions; and, on the other, the need for legal deﬁnition,
professional expertise, and scaling up into institutional structures. If such mutual
experiments are to take root and grow in other disinvested contexts, more system-
atic support and coordination from intermediary bodies, such as regional-scale
umbrellas, is required to nurture the seeds and plant new seeds through viral
transfer: to bring together localised experiments into a more connected move-
ment; to enable mutual learning, knowledge sharing, and resource pooling, whilst
avoiding the pitfalls of professionalisation. In a promising move, the National CLT
Network (2015) has recently secured social investment funds for an Urban CLT
Project to offer £10,000 grants to 20 demonstration projects to speciﬁcally support
the difﬁcult transition stages after start-up, such as negotiating with land
acquisition.
Insights may be drawn from Liverpool’s housing history: progressive lessons
from the cooperative education and design democracy at the heart of the 1970s
new build co-op movement; and also warning signs. Just as the city’s huge housing
associations, recently helping deliver HMR demolition, started out as place-based
charitable trusts—CDS morphing into Plus Dane, for instance—so too is there a dan-
ger that Granby, like other CLTs, might eventually mutate into an unwieldy concern
with large-scale property interests and little connection to people or place. A key
question for further research is how to secure lasting collective dweller control with-
out becoming just another part of the shadow state, overloaded with unwanted
public service delivery responsibilities. In seeking to develop and replicate success-
ful common ownership institutions, we run the risk of diluting, paralysing, and
fossilising into inﬂexible bureaucratic structures the informal, spontaneous, and cre-
ative energies of commoning which animate radical collective action.
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